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ABSTRACT
One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the La-
grangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two
formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geo-
metrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the
question whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of
classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: I state and prove two technical results,
inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems,
to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric struc-
ture Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none that
Hamiltonian mechanics does. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure
of the two systems of mechanics, their relations to each other, and their respective mech-
anisms for representing physical systems. It also provides a decisive counter-example
to the semantical view of physical theories, and one, moreover, that shows its crucial
deficiency: a theory must be, or at least be founded on, more than its collection of mod-
els (in the sense of Tarski), for a complete semantics requires that one take account of
global structures defined by relations among the individual models. The example also
shows why naively structural accounts of theory cannot work: simple isomorphism of
theoretical and empirical structures is not rich enough a relation to ground a semantics.
†I thank Robert Geroch for many stimulating conversations in which the seeds of this paper’s technical arguments
were germinated and, in some cases, fully cultivated. I also thank John Norton for making me explain the technical
arguments to him with enough care and thoroughness so as to allow him to offer many useful suggestions about how
to give them a simpler, more digestible form, without the need for heavy machinery throughout. I am grateful to
Chris Pincock for stimulating and edifying conversations about the semantical view of physical theories, in which he
set straight a few misunderstandings I had. Email: erik@strangebeautiful.com
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1 Introduction
The semantical view of physical theories relies on models to provide the bridge between a theory’s
formal structures and the structure of phenomena in the world. In weak versions of the view, a theory
is characterized by its models; in stronger views, the theory simply is the collection of its models.1 In
either case, however, it is a tenet of the view that a theory’s model adequately represents a physical
system only when the model and the system possess relevant, isomorphic structures. It follows that,
at a minimum, when two theories provide sound models for the same physical systems, then the
models of those two theories should share the same structure in some important sense, including
at a minimum that the shared structure have essentially the same physically significant semantic
content in the respective representations of the system. The case of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics shows that the tenet cannot be correct. Both yield sound models of the same systems,
but neither possesses any structure isomorphic in a physically significant way to any in the other.
I go on at some length in §§2–3 chracterizing classical systems and showing the intrinsic empirical
structures they generically manifest, with perhaps more caution and care than some readers will like,
because those arguments and constructions are among the clearest, most compelling cases I know of
the derivation of physically significant, empirically grounded, formally precise structure accruing to
an entire class of physical systems starting from the simplest of assumptions. It is a sterling example
of what the semantical view of physical theories lives for. Thus, the strength of the putative counter-
example to that view is in direct proportion to the strength and naturalness of the constructions
that lead one to a case that, at first blush, should do nothing but substantiate it.
1See, e.g., Brading and Landry (2004) for a concise and elegant summary of the semantical view and a comparison
with the syntactical view.
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Because the primary philosophical claims of the paper are surprising, moreover, and will I am
sure be controversial, I give in §§4–6 the exposition of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics and
of their relations in some detail, to substantiate the claims. I do this as well because, with few
exceptions, philosophers of physics have tended to give short shrift to the philosophical problems
that lie at the foundation of classical mechanics.2 I think the neglect is unjustified. Just as the
mathematical theories of classical mechanics still today provide frameworks and fodder for deep
investigations in several fields of pure mathematics, so they can in philosophy, both with regard to
traditional questions philosophers tend to examine in the context of quantum mechanics or relativity
theory, and with regard to questions peculiar to classical mechanics itself. I hope that this paper’s
attempt to clarify the conceptual structure of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics makes that
case by example.
For those who do not want to work through all the technical details, I give at the beginning of
each of §§4–6 a brief summary of what I intend to accomplish and at the end a summary of what has
been achieved along with suggestive comments about its role in the overarching argument about the
semantics of physical theories. §7 contains the gathering together and summation of that argument
in non-technical terms.
Finally, I must remark that some of what I put down when I use or discuss technical machinery
will be, strictly speaking, incorrect or meaningless, but I think it still paints an accurate picture
without the need for deep mathematics, which justifies the abuses I heap on it. Curiel (2009) gives
a rigorous exposition of all the technical matter used and discussed in this paper, along with proofs
of the two primary technical results, theorems 4.1 and 5.1.
2 Classical Systems
Our first objective is to construct a framework for the description of classical systems in a way
independent of the details of any particular theoretical framework.3 The description will include a
characterization of a classical system’s space of states and its family of dynamical evolutions. I will
call a system so represented a dynamical system. This abstract characterization of classical systems
provides an appropriate framework for the constructions and arguments we require.
I take as fundamental the idea of a system: roughly speaking, something one can look at, interact
with. A quantity associated with a system or type of system is any property a system may bear
amenable to experimental observation; it is a (possibly variable) magnitude that can be thought of
as belonging to the system, in so far as it can be measured (at least in principle) by an experimental
apparatus designed to interact with that type of system, in a fashion conforming to a particular
coupling of the system with its environment, which coupling may be modeled theoretically once a
2Butterfield (2003, 2004) is a notable exception.
3I do not claim that one can describe actual classical systems in the context of a physical investigation with the use
of no particular, theoretical framework, only that there is a way of abstracting from the details of whatever theoretical
apparatus may be involved in any given case, in the way I attempt in this section.
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theory is in place.4 One assumes that, somehow or other—it does not matter for our purposes how—
one has fixed on a set of quantities that play a privileged role in the description and comprehension
of the system, those that are physically significant. Linear acceleration and angular momentum
are physically significant quantities in the Newtonian mechanics of rigid bodies, for example; the
temporal derivative of acceleration (the third temporal derivative of position) and the magnitude
computed by adding the numerical values of position and velocity at a point are not.
A state of a system is the aggregation of its physically significant properties at an instant; it is
represented by a proposition encapsulating all that can be known of the system physically, at least
so far as the pre-theoretical, theoretical and experimental resources one relies on are concerned. If
one can distinguish the properties of the system at one time from those at another time by the
available resources, then the system is in a state at the first time different from that at the second.
A state, therefore, can be thought of as a set of the values of quantities that jointly suffice for the
identification of a point of the dynamical space of states, which is itself the set containing all states
one has identified in practice and all those one extrapolates the system can occupy. Because each
state assigns a definite value for each quantity to the system, a quantity is represented by a function
on the space of states that assigns to each state a definite value of some mathematical entity, such
as a real number or a vector in a vector space.
As a brute fact about the physical world, every dynamical system we know of has this property:
it has associated with it a number, either a single positive, even integer or else infinity, which is the
minimum number of independent quantities whose values one must fix in order to individuate and
identify a state; this number is the same for all states the system can occupy, no matter the set of
quantities whose values one uses to label the states, viz., the system’s degrees of freedom.5 (Mine
is a non-standard usage of ‘degrees of freedom’, which is often taken to refer to the dimension of
configuration space, which I will discuss below, not to that of the total space of states.) These facts
allow one to attribute further structure to the space of states, those of a topological and a differential
manifold. One derives the topology by requiring all quantities to be continuous (except perhaps at
a finite number of points), and one derives the manifold structure by requiring that all quantities
be smooth (except perhaps at a finite number of points).6 So quantities play a dual role, one local
4This characterization of quantity involves (at least) one serious over-simplification. Not all quantities’ values can
be determined by direct preparation or measurement, not even in principle. Some, such as that of entropy, can only be
calculated from those of others that are themselves directly preparable or measurable. Other quantities are ambiguous
in this regard—does the application of a ruler to a system to measure its length count as a coupling of the system
with its environment? These subtleties do not affect the paper’s arguments.
5As stated, the claim is not correct. I know of exactly one example of a dynamical system that has an odd number
of degrees of freedom: it is a simple device, consisting of two rigid discs joined by a straight, rigid axle connected to
each by a universal joint at its center; it rolls without friction or slippage on a curved surface. I claim that system has
seven total degrees of freedom. (I’m sure other examples along the same or similar lines can be constructed.) I do not
know what to make of such anomalies, so I ignore them for the sake of argument. For what it’s worth, I know of no
account or discussion of classical mechanics, either in the physical or the philosophical literature, that even remarks
on their existence, so I can at least claim that my putting of them aside is no worse practice than that of any other
investigator I know of.
6To allow finite numbers of discontinuities in the quantities requires the use of straightforward but tedious and
unilluminating, technical machinery to allow for their use in defining the topology and the differential structure; we
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and the other global: they individuate and identify the states, and they determine the topological
and differential structures of the space of states.
Every known dynamical system has the property that at least a subset of its quantities almost
always change in value as time passes, which is to say, the system in general occupies different states
at different moments of time. The collection of states it serially occupies during an interval of time,
moreover, form a curve on the dynamical space of states parametrized by time, a kinematically
possible evolution (or just ‘possible evolution’), which is in general smooth. From the family of
all possible evolutions, one constructs the family of kinematically possible vector fields (or just
‘kinematical vector fields’), those whose integral curves (the curves that “thread the arrows in
the vector field”) are possible evolutions. Because a vector field on a manifold can be thought
of in a natural way as a first-order ordinary differential equation, the kinematical vector fields
encode the equations of motion for all possible interactions of the system with its environment. The
solutions to the equations of motion are by construction the system’s possible evolutions. The family
of kinematical vector fields provides a description of the possible histories of a dynamical system
equivalent to that given by the family of possible evolution curves, and one more convenient for our
purposes, so I will mostly rely on it in the discussion. Finally, there is a distinguished kinematical
vector field, the free kinematical vector field, that represents the evolution of the system when it is
isolated from all external forces.
I claim that this characterization of dynamical systems comprises all basic, physically significant
structure required to found the investigation of classical systems. It does not provide all the structure
that comes into play in all forms of investigations, but it does provide all the tools one requires to
define and construct all the other structures. A proper defense of this claim is beyond this paper’s
scope, though the constructions of §3 will go some way towards providing the beginnings of a sketch
of one. Nor do I claim that this characterization is canonical in the sense that no other one comprising
other natural structures one takes to be basic can be given. I claim only that it provides one quite
natural, necessary and sufficient toolbox and supply of material for the job.
Before leaving the section, I want to record a virtue of this way of thinking of the framework of
classical mechanics: it teases out several of the puzzling features of classical mechanics, ones that
are otherwise easy to pass by without remark, so familiar are they to those with even a passing
acquaintance with it. Although I do not address them in this paper, I think it is worthwhile to
pause for a moment to list them. Why is it that no matter what set of distinct quantities one uses to
characterize the state of a system, one always needs only a certain fixed number of such quantities,
the same for all sets of quantities (the degrees of freedom), no matter how different the quantities in
each set may be from those in other sets? What ought to count as distinct or significant quantities?
For a Newtonian particle, the quantity formed by multiplying the numerical value of the position
by that of the velocity does not seem to be physically significant; it is often unclear whether 5 times
or 5 plus a significant quantity ought to count as a different quantity than the original. It is not the
case that two quantities ought to be counted as different only if they can be varied independently
can ignore these sorts of problems for our purposes.
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of each other, for then momentum and energy for a free particle would not be different quantities.
Perhaps the most fundamental question is this: why does the space of states of a classical system
always have the structure of a differentiable manifold? A closely related point is that the following
appears to be one of the principles of mechanics (whatever that may come to) for dynamical systems:
there always exists a smooth tangent vector field whose integral curves are the kinematically possible
evolutions of the systems. The meaning of this: “ordinary differential equations are appropriate for
the modeling of classical systems”. Thus families of curves on the space of states that do not have
associated tangent vector fields simply cannot be possible dynamical evolutions of the system. An
example of such a family of curves is that for a particle in a square potential well—presumably here
one would say that the square potential is an idealization, and that if one looked closely enough
it would really be a very steep but still smooth potential. Another example is a family of curves
that intersect each other; in this case, simple determinism would fail. There are no a priori reasons
why any of these facts should hold. Most strikingly, none of these facts depends on the fixation of
a particular theory for their statement or for their substantiation. They seem to reach down to and
represent structure at a very deep level of our understanding of classical systems.
3 The Possible Interactions of a Classical System and the
Structure of Its Space of States
I have gone into such detail in §2 in the characterization of dynamical systems because, as I will show
in this section, that abstract framework already provides the tools for a construction of startling
physical strength and depth: starting from only very weak, almost trivial seeming assumptions,
one can recover and describe in the framework of dynamical systems the family of kinematically
possible interactions (or just ‘possible interactions’) any classical system can enter into with any
other classical system; even more, one can show that the family of possible interactions has a rich
algebraic structure, concomitant with one that will show itself in the family of kinematical vector
fields; from those objects, finally, one can show that the dynamical space of states naturally possesses
the structure of a space that plays a foundational role in classical mechanics, viz., the tangent bundle
of configuration space, the natural theater in which Lagrangian mechanics plays itself out.7 The
strength of the result derives from the weakness of the system one uses to formulate it in and the
weakness of the assumptions one uses to prove it. That result grounds the theorems of §§4–5 whose
natural interpretation is that classical systems evince exactly the physically significant structure
of Lagrangian mechanics, nothing more and nothing less, and none of the physically significant
structure of Hamiltonian mechanics.
In traditional accounts of classical analytical mechanics (that is, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics), one distinguishes three sorts of quantity, the configuration-like (or ‘configurative’), the
velocity-like (or ‘velocital’) and the momentum-like (or ‘momental’). The configurative and the
velocital are used in the formulation of Lagrangian mechanics, and the configurative and momental
7The construction is due to R. Geroch; I learned of it in conversation with him.
Erik Curiel 6 September 27, 2009
Lagrangian, Not Hamiltonian
for Hamiltonian mechanics. As their names suggest, the defining properties of the velocital and the
momental quantities for a generic dynamical system are the same as (or, at least, very similar to)
those for velocity and momentum, respectively, in Newtonian mechanics. Configurative quantities
are those having many or all of the same significant properties as position in Newtonian mechanics.
Indeed, most expositions of analytical mechanics postulate the differences among these as primitive
and foundational. We, however, did not have to distinguish between different types of quantities in
the characterization of dynamical systems in §2, and so nothing like a configuration space (the set
of all configurations, which naturally accrues the structure of a manifold) showed its face; nor did
any but the simplest of algebraic and geometric structures appear in the construction of the theory,
nor any set of preferred coordinates, etc. At this stage, therefore, nothing in the description of a
dynamical system seems to militate in favor of a Lagrangian as opposed to a Hamiltonian formulation
of it, or vice-versa, if that is the sort of thing one wants. Part of the goal of this section, however,
is to distinguish configurative and velocital quantities and explicate their properties. (We will not
treat momental ones until §5.) As we will see, the characterization of the possible interactions a
classical system can enter into with other systems provides the key.
Now, we want a way using only the concepts sketched in §2 to characterize a property or set
of properties (physical, structural, what-have-you) of the quantities a system possesses that will
differentiate the configurative from the velocital. With that in hand, we will be able to construct
the configuration space, in the traditional sense, of the dynamical system, which in turn will found
the argument for the naturalness of Lagrangian mechanics for classical systems. As it turns out,
the investigation of a system’s possible interactions provides the tools to answer the question. To
start, let us pose a more concrete question about configuration space. What, for example, should
one choose as the configuration coordinates in trying to represent an electromagnetic field as a
Lagrangian system, the electric or the magnetic field, and why? These questions would perhaps not
seem so pressing to one raised on a diet of traditional text-books on analytical mechanics, in which
the author generally starts with configuration space (usually presented in some particular coordinate
system, the physical significance of which is itself not discussed) and marches courageously forward.8
But the configuration spaces of physical systems were not handed down by Prometheus with fire,
and on its face it is rather a mystery where they come from, what they do and why we need them.
Simple measurement of dynamical systems, it seems, will get one at most the dynamical space of
states and the allowed kinematical vector fields, but it would not seem to get one by itself a preferred
way to factor the space of states, so to speak, into configurative and velocital parts.
Consider a simple example, say that of a free particle. Its state can be completely described
by giving its position and its velocity, each of which can be thought of as a vector in ordinary,
three-dimensional space; its space of states is therefore six-dimensional. Using those two quantities
to parametrize the space of states (i.e., to label its points, the states) a representation of a state
has the form (x, v), where x is the particle’s position and v its velocity; we say this representation
provides a natural coordinate system for the space, for we know already that these two quantities
8This happens even in texts written by physicists who normally display a sensitivity to philosophical problems,
such as Whittaker (1947, ch. ii, §26, pp. 34–39).
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play a privileged role in our comprehension of Newtonian mechanics. The equations of motion
representing the particle’s evolution take the form
x˙ = v
v˙ = 0
(3.1)
(I use emboldened signs to designate vectors. I abuse the notation in the usual ways, using, e.g., ‘v’ to
designate promiscuously either a single vector or a vector field, etc. A dot indicates differentiation
with respect to time, and ‘0’ designates the zero vector or vector field.) This is just Newton’s
Second Law, written out in more explicit form than is usual: the temporal derivative of position
is velocity, and that of velocity is acceleration, in this case zero since we have postulated that the
system experience no force. The kinematical vector field associated with this evolution is, in these
coordinates, (v, 0). The first component of the vector field measures the rate of change of the
position, and the second that of velocity.
Now, if one turns on an interaction with the environment and pushes the particle around, then
during the interaction the equations of motion become
x˙ = v
v˙ = Fpush
(3.2)
where Fpush is the force exerted on the particle during the interaction, which may be a function of
anything one likes; the associated kinematical vector field is (v, Fpush). One is not free to postulate
any new vector field one likes to represent the particle’s evolution during the interaction, which is to
say one cannot simply dream up just any sort of interaction: one can “directly push around” only
the velocities. As a brute empirical fact, there is no known interaction for changing the equation
of motion of x directly. (Indeed, that is part of why it is more often thought of as a kinematical
constraint than an equation of motion, but nothing in the formal structure of the theory itself
divorced from our empirical knowledge allows one to distinguish between the equation for x˙ and
that for v˙ in any principled way.) In consequence, the velocities need not evolve continuously as one
switches interactions on and off, for one can in principle turn the interaction on and off as abruptly
as one likes, whereas the position always evolves continuously.9 This empirical fact does allow us
to distinguish between position and velocity as physical quantities, and so between their respective
equations of temporal evolution. The families of solutions the respective equations have differ in
the form of the functions they contain: velocital quantities include discontinuous functions, whereas
configurative ones do not.
Consider now the example of a free electromagnetic field, specified, say, everywhere in space at a
given instant of time. The space of states in this case is infinite-dimensional. In a natural coordinate
9This claim may appear to conflict with my earlier stipulation that the quantities specify the manifold structure of
the space of states by the requirement that they be smooth. The conflict is illusory, though: there will inevitably be
slippage between the rigorous mathematical structure one constructs to represent the system and the results of actual
measurements one makes. This slippage and how one deals with it will depend on the particular ends of the project at
hand, the approximations and techniques one uses, etc. One can ameliorate the slippage by allowing some quantities
in the formal representation to be discontinuous at a finite number of point, as already mentioned in footnote 6.
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system, a state is of the form (∇ ·B, B˙, ∇ ·E, E˙), where E and B are respectively the components
of the electric and magnetic fields in the fixed coordinate system. (It will be clear in a moment why
I use ∇ ·B and ∇ ·B for the components of the state rather than simply B and E.) The equations
of motion are Maxwell’s equations,
∇ ·B = 0
B˙ = −∇×E
∇ ·E = 0
E˙ =∇×B
The associated kinematical vector field is (0, −∇ × E, 0, ∇ × B). The only allowed interactions
take the form
∇ ·B = 0
B˙ = −∇×E
∇ ·E = ρ
E˙ =∇×B+ 
where ρ is an electrical charge density and  is its associated current. The associated kinematical
vector field is (0, −∇×E, ρ, ∇×B+ ). It turns out also to be the case here that the equations of
motion of one set of coordinates, B and B˙, allow their components to evolve only continuously no
matter what interaction is turned on or off—the functional form of their components do not change,
but remain 0 and −∇×E respectively throughout the interaction—whereas the components of the
other set of coordinates can evolve discontinuously, depending on the form of the interaction—again,
we can in principle turn the charge density and the current on and off as quickly as we like. This
suggests that, by analogy with the case of the Newtonian particles, we take (∇ ·B, B˙) to encode
the system’s configuration and (∇ ·E, E˙) its phase velocity.
So far as is known, it is a brute fact about the physical world that all systems adequately and
appropriately described by classical mechanics have this property: only some physical quantities
associated with the system can evolve discontinuously during its interactions with the environment,
whereas others always evolve continuously. So one generalizes: the configurative quantities are
those that one cannot directly push around via any of the allowed interactions of the system with
its environment, and so they are the ones that evolve continuously—hit a system with a stick, and
the quantities that change continuously across the change in evolution are configurative. It does
not seem possible to give a similarly natural characterization of velocital quantities. We cannot say
simpliciter that they are the ones that can change discontinuously under interactions, for mixed
quantities such as x · v for the particle can as well.10 One is tempted to say that velocital quantities
10It is my sense that such faux-quantities as x · v never play a significant role in an appropriate and adequate model
of a system. The present analysis sheds light on why this should be: the configurative and velocital quantities of a
dynamical system play different roles in the kinematics of the system’s representation, the one independent (“to first-
order”) of couplings to the environment and the other entering directly into those couplings and (often) constrained
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are the ones that “couple directly with external forces”, but I do not see a way of making that
idea precise in a way that excludes non-physical, mixed quantities. Perhaps one can say that the
physically significant velocital quantities always seem to be characterized by a kinematical constraint
expressing them in terms of dynamical derivatives of configurative quantities, but it is not clear to
me that even this is true—E and B, for instance, are more or less symmetric in this respect. Neither
can one say that the velocital quantities are the ones functionally independent of configurative ones,
since in fact in many cases they are not, being related to configurative ones by way of a differential
relation. We will see below, however, that, though velocital scalar quantities cannot be characterized
in a way analogous to that for configurative ones, velocital directions in the space of states, so to
speak, can be characterized in a precise sense.11
This result now justifies thinking of x˙ = v as a kinematical constraint rather than an equation of
motion—the empirical observation gave us enough information to impose a way to differentiate the
two formally identical equations that formed the sets (3.1) and (3.2). A kinematical constraint in a
theory imposes relations that must hold among the possible values of some set of a system’s physical
quantities in order for one to be able to apply the theory to appropriately model a physical system.
Theories do not predict kinematical constraints; they demand them. Newtonian mechanics does
not predict that the kinematical velocity of a Newtonian body equal the temporal rate of change
of its position; rather it requires it as a precondition for its own applicability. If the kinematical
constraints demanded by a theory do not hold for a family of phenomena, that theory cannot treat
it. Thus, it does seem proper to think of x˙ = v as a kinematical constraint rather than an equation
of motion in our example.
We now have a characterization of configurative quantities derived from the intrinsic physics of
dynamical systems. The argument that led to that characterization will now allow us to attribute
a rich geometrical structure to the family of kinematical vector fields, and at the same time to
introduce an important new family of vector fields. Because the allowed interactions directly affect
only the values of the velocital quantities, the difference of two kinematical vector fields will always
yield a vector field whose configurative components vanish but whose velocital components do not.
It is easy to see this from a quick look at the expressions for the kinematical vector fields of the two
to satisfy a differential equation posed in terms of a configurative quantity, such as v = x˙. It does not seem possible
for a single physical property of a system to play both roles at once. I shall give a more precise statement of this in
§4.
11In many accounts of Lagrangian mechanics, the configurative quantities are taken as somehow primary and the
velocital as derived. My approach has the virtue of making clear that neither configurative nor velocital quantities
ought to be treated as primary or prior in any way; they each stand on their own as physically significant and in
principle kinematically independent entities. Some philosophers, to the contrary, have taken the standard sort of
exposition, in which configurations are primary, to imply metaphysical theses of extraordinary weight. Wallace (2003,
p. 164), for example, says, “The only ontologically primary entities in this picture are the configurations and the
paths through them: momentum, for instance, is only a derivative property of a path, and (unlike in Hamiltonian
mechanics) cannot be regarded as on a par with configuration.” This remark becomes particularly poignant in light
of the fact that, as we will see below in §5, one cannot even define the notion of “configuration” in Hamiltonian
mechanics in any principled way. These remarks will become clearer after the exposition of Lagrangian mechanics
and the arguments connecting it to dynamical systems, in §4.
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examples—the first component is the same, so their difference is zero. For the particle, for example,
fix two forces F1 and F2 and consider the respective kinematical vector fields for each, (v, F1) and
(v, F2). Their difference is
(0, F2 − F1)
Similarly, for a Maxwell field the difference of the kinematical vector fields for two different charge
and current distributions (ρ1, 1) and (ρ2, 2) takes the form
(0, 0, ρ2 − ρ1, 2 − 1)
or, more suggestively,
((0, 0), (ρ2 − ρ1, 2 − 1))
These difference-vectors point only in velocital directions, as it were. Because the components of
vectors on the space of states represent the rates of change of the quantities that form the coordinates,
one can also say that these difference vectors encode only non-trivial rates of change for velocital
quantities, viz., accelerations.
It is easy to see that all the vectors of that form have the structure of a vector space: if I add
two of them or multiply one by a real number, I get another vector of the same form. I shall call
such a vector field an ‘interaction vector field’, because it encodes all and only information about
a kinematically possible interaction the system can enter into. The examples, moreover, make it
plausible that the addition of any interaction vector field to any kinematical vector field should
itself yield a kinematical vector field—this makes physical sense, because I can in principle hit the
particle with as big or as small a stick as I want no matter its present dynamical state, and turn
on as large or as small a charged current as I choose to interact with the Maxwell field. Thus the
set of kinematical vector fields has the structure of an affine space, modeled on the vector space of
interaction vector fields.12
We are finally in a position to show first that the form of the family of interaction vector fields
allows one to construct a system’s configuration space in a distinguished geometrical way, and
then to show that the dynamical space of states is naturally isomorphic with a very important
space associated with its configuration space, viz., its tangent bundle. That will complete the
arguments of this section. (That the space of states turns out to be naturally isomorphic to the
configuration space’s tangent bundle is important because the tangent bundle is the natural setting
for the formulation of Lagrangian mechanics, though this fact is obscured in standard presentations.)
Now, because interaction vector fields point, so to speak, only in velocital directions, they are in one-
to-one correspondence, roughly speaking, with half the dimensions of the space of states at any given
point.13 (One can see this in the examples by noting that the representation of a vector always has
the same number of velocital as configurative slots.) If I fix a point on the space of states and follow
12An affine space is essentially a vector space in which one “forgets the zero vector”. Only the difference of two
elements in an affine space is defined, and it is always defined to be an element of a vector space, the one the affine
space is modeled on. The sum of two elements of an affine space is not defined.
13The latter property, obviously, depends on the fact that the space of states is even-dimensional in the finite case;
see footnote 5.
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all the interaction vector fields off that point, then, intuitively speaking, I’ll end up passing through
a subspace of the space of states of half its dimension. This constitutes an equivalence relation: “is
connected by one of the interaction vector fields to”; each of those equivalence classes, moreover,
does indeed form a subspace of the space of states of half its dimension. Because those subspaces
are disjoint, there is, therefore, a natural representation of the space of states as the collection of all
of them suitably “glued together”. Now, if I move from point to point in one of those subspaces, the
configuration of the system does not change by construction, because, again, all the interaction vector
fields defining the subspace do not point in configurative directions. It follows that all the points in
a single subspace in some sense represent the system as having the same configuration. We can thus
construct the configuration space of the space of states by forming an abstract collection of points in
one-to-one correspondence with the equivalence classes—the abstract point associated with a given
equivalence class represents the system’s configuration that class corresponds to. Configuration
space so constructed inherits the structure of a differential manifold from the dynamical space of
states.
It is worth remarking before moving on that, on the assumption that the kinematical vector fields
are fundamental in some sense, as indeed they seem to be—in this picture, one gets the dynamical
space of states and the kinematical vector fields before one gets the interactions and configuration
space—this analysis yields a surprising conclusion. What counts as a configurative quantity for
dynamical systems cannot be determined by examining a system in isolation; there is rather a deep
connection between configurative quantities and how the system can interact with its environment.
In other words, configuration space is an implicit description of the allowed interactions of the system
with its environment: what counts as a configurative quantity is not intrinsic to the system, but is
rather a property of the system’s allowed interactions with the environment.14
Now, to show that the dynamical space of states is isomorphic to the tangent bundle of config-
uration space, I first sketch the idea of a tangent bundle. Roughly speaking, a point of a space’s
tangent bundle is an ordered pair consisting of a point of the space itself and a vector tangent to
the space at that point. Thus, the tangent bundle associates with every point in the original space
the vector space of all vectors tangent to the space at that point. To get an intuitive feel for the
thing, imagine a globe with a very thin, flat glass plate touching it at exactly one point, such that
every ray in the plate originating at the point of contact—the osculating point—makes the same
angle with the globe; the plate then is the tangent plane of the point, containing every line tangent
to the globe at that point. We can make this into a vector space by declaring the zero vector to be
the osculating point in the plane. Every vector originating at the osculating point and contained in
the plane, then, is a vector tangent to the globe at that point. A point of the globe’s tangent bundle
consists of a point of the globe and a vector tangent to the globe at that point, i.e., an element of
the point’s tangent plane. The tangent bundle of an arbitrary manifold is the analog of the globe’s
tangent bundle: we define a vector tangent to a point of the manifold to be a vector tangent to a
curve passing through the point; and a point of the space’s tangent bundle is then an ordered pair
14This is one important reason I think points of view such as that of Wallace (2003) (briefly discussed in footnote 11)
are not viable.
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consisting of a point of the space and a vector tangent to the space at that point. Thus, one can
think of a manifold’s tangent bundle as the collection of all tangent planes over every point of the
manifold smoothly glued together into a single space. For a point p in the manifold, the collection
of all points (p, ξ) in the tangent bundle, i.e., all pairs such that ξ is a vector tangent to p, is called
the fiber over p.
I construct the isomorphism by showing how to associate a point of the space of states with a
point of the tangent bundle in such a way that every point of each is associated with exactly one
point of the other. Recall that the family of kinematical vector fields of a dynamical system has a
distinguished member, the free field. Starting from any state, a dynamical system can freely evolve
in any direction, with any velocity; in other words, the free vector field includes all vectors tangent
to all configurations, i.e., all the possible rates of change of that configuration starting from that
state. Thus the free kinematical field encodes all the system’s possible instantaneous configurations
and their dynamical derivatives, and nothing more. It follows that the value of the free vector field
at a point of the space of states is naturally associated with the configuration that state attributes to
the system and with the dynamical derivative (i.e., the velocity) that state attributes to the system.
Such an ordered pair, however, is exactly a point of the tangent bundle of configuration space. It
follows that, in so far as the free dynamical vector field is itself a distinguished vector field, one has a
distinguished isomorphism from the dynamical space of states to the tangent bundle of configuration
space, completing the construction.
Theorem 3.1 (R. Geroch) There is a canonical diffeomorphism from the space of states of a
dynamical system to the tangent bundle of its configuration space.
Before moving on, it is worthwhile pausing to take stock of our progress. From a weak physical
assumption inferred directly from observation—that interactions can directly affect only a classical
system’s velocital quantities—we have discovered an entirely new structure on the space of states,
the vector space of interaction vector fields; we have recovered a rich algebraic structure on the
space of kinematical vector fields; we have discovered a way to characterize configurative quantities
in an invariant way that, at the same time, clarifies their meaning (viz., they encode the possible
interactions); we have constructed the configuration space of the system; and we have shown that
the space of states is naturally isomorphic to the tangent bundle over its configuration space. I find
these results remarkable for the depth and breadth of physical knowledge they provide of the intrinsic
nature of classical systems, especially in light of the weakness of the assumptions we started from.
It is on its face a peculiarly strong and clear example of the sort that gives the structural-semantical
view of physical theories the appeal it has.
4 Classical Systems Are Lagrangian
I first describe how the structures of a dynamical system, when carried over to the tangent bundle of
configuration space by the canonical isomorphism, allow one to construct a Lagrangian formulation
for it. It will follow that dynamical systems are Lagrangian in a natural, precise sense. I then
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describe how having in hand a traditional Lagrangian representation of a classical system, in the
most minimal sense, allows one to construct its abstract dynamical representation. In consequence,
Lagrangian systems are dynamical in a natural, precise sense.
The Euler-Lagrange equation, the heart of Lagrangian mechanics, takes a scalar field (the La-
grangian) that depends on configurations and velocities and determines as its solution a vector field
that gives the kinematical evolution of the system.15 That is why Lagrangian mechanics is most
naturally formulated on the tangent bundle of configuration space: the function that determines the
kinematically possible evolutions has as its domain ordered pairs consisting of a configuration and
a velocity at that configuration, which is just a point of the tangent bundle; and the evolution of
a body consists of a curve comprising pairs of configurations and velocities at those configurations,
which is just a curve on the tangent bundle.
Now, there is a natural way to associate a curve on any manifold, such as configuration space,
with a curve on its tangent bundle, a procedure known as lifting the curve. A curve on configuration
space by definition has a tangent vector at every point it passes through, the one that represents
the rate of change of the curve at that point; a point of configuration space and a vector at that
point, however, is just a point in its tangent bundle, so the collection of points forming the curve
yields a collection of points on the tangent bundle. It is easy to see that the smooth progression of
points along the curve on configuration space ensures that the family of points lifted to the tangent
bundle themselves form a smooth curve. Thus, one can lift a vector field on configuration space to the
tangent bundle by lifting its integral curves, yielding the vector field everywhere tangent to the lifted
curves. I call such vector fields on the tangent bundle second-order, because they represent second-
order ordinary differential equations on configuration space, just as a vector field on configuration
space itself represents a first-order ordinary differential equation. These vector fields are important
because they form the family of possible solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation, the Lagrangian
vector fields: a vector field represents a possible solution to the Euler-Lagrange equation if and only
if it is second-order.
I claim this makes sense on physical grounds. One can think of a second-order vector as the
acceleration of a curve on configuration space: in so far as a vector on the tangent bundle can be
thought of as an infinitesimal change in the configurative directions plus one in the velocital direc-
tions, a second-order vector always has its infinitesimal rate of change in configurative directions
equal to the kinematical velocity of a body traversing the curve lifted from configuration space, and
its infinitesimal rate of change in velocital directions equal to the rate of change of the kinemat-
ical velocity along the curve, i.e., the body’s acceleration. In other words, a second-order vector
field represents physical evolutions that respect the kinematical constraints connecting configurative
quantities to their respective, associated velocital ones. This is why it makes sense on physical
grounds for solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation to be second-order vector fields. Thus, the
second-order vector field that represents the evolution of a free Newtonian particle, for example, has
15In fact, this is true only of the homogeneous Euler-Lagrange equation; the inhomogeneous Euler-Lagrange equation
can include so-called generalized forces. Although the difference between the two is important in several of the rigorous,
technical arguments, we do not need to worry about it for our purposes.
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the same form as the free kinematical vector field in the example of §3, (v, 0), as does a particle
experiencing a force F, (v, F). This suggests there is an intimate relation between the kinematical
vector fields of a dynamical system and the possible solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation. That
will turn out to be correct.
In order to represent these objects in explicit terms, first note that a coordinate system (qi) on
configuration space C naturally induces one on its tangent bundle TC, (qi, vj), where the vi represent
vectors tangent to curves on C when those curves are parametrized in terms of the qi—in other words,
vi = q˙i. These natural coordinates are the generalization of (x, v) as used on the dynamical space
of states of the Newtonian particle. We will represent vectors explicitly as sums over the basis of
vectors defined by natural coordinate systems. For the standard Cartesian coordinates (x, y) on the
plane, for example, the vectors defined by the x coordinate, which we write ‘ ∂∂x ’, are the unit vectors
pointing parallel to the x-axis, one at each point of the plane, and the same for the y-coordinates;
at every point of the plane, then, any vector k can be written
kx
∂
∂x
+ ky
∂
∂y
where kx are its x-components, etc.
Now, fix a natural coordinate system (qi, vj) on TC. Any second-order vector field ξ can be
written in the form16
vi
∂
∂qi
+ ξj
∂
∂vj
(4.1)
in any natural coordinate system, where the ξi are arbitrary functions of qi and vj . The fact that
vi, the kinematical velocity, is the component of the configurative part of the vector encodes the
fact that ξ is second-order. There is another class of naturally distinguished vector fields on TC, the
vertical ones. A vertical vector field is one whose elements point straight up and down the fibers,
i.e., that point only in non-configurative directions. Any vertical vector field η has the form
ηi
∂
∂vi
(4.2)
where the ηi are arbitrary functions of qi and vj . The families of vertical and second-order vector
fields have natural structures. The vertical vector fields form a vector space; one can see this from
the generic expression (4.2). The second-order vector fields form an affine space modeled on the
vertical vector fields, as one can see from the generic expression (4.1).
For a given scalar field, the Lagrangian L, the (homogeneous) Euler-Lagrange equation in natural
coordinates has the form
d
dt
(
∂L
∂vi
)
− ∂L
∂qi
= 0 (4.3)
The solution to this equation (if there is one), the Lagrangian vector field associated with the
Lagrangian L, is a vector field ξ on the tangent bundle. Not every scalar field yields a well posed
16I use the Einstein-summation convention, where one implicitly assumes a sum over the values of all repeated
indices. Thus, for example, ‘vi
∂
∂qi
’ is short-hand for ‘
P
i vi
∂
∂qi
’.
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Euler-Lagrange equation, however. To state the conditions under which this is true, let us say that
a Lagrangian L is regular if
det
∣∣∣∣ ∂2L∂vk ∂vl
∣∣∣∣ 6= 0 (4.4)
in any natural coordinate system on TC. Only regular Lagrangians are guaranteed to have unique,
second-order solutions. It is not obvious how the condition (4.4) does this. Roughly speaking, the
condition guarantees that a certain anti-symmetric matrix the Lagrangian defines be invertible. The
coordinate form of the Euler-Lagrange equation, (4.3), masks the presence of this matrix,17 but it is
there under the scenes, and the fact that it is invertible guarantees the existence of a unique solution.
We are now in a position to address the first problem we set ourselves in this section, the construc-
tion of a Lagrangian formulation of a dynamical system using only the structure the representation
of a dynamical system makes available. We know already from theorem 3.1 that the dynamical space
of states is canonically diffeomorphic to the tangent bundle of configuration space. An argument
similar to that used in §3 to prove the theorem shows that under this diffeomorphism the image of
the family of interaction vector fields on the space of states is the vector space of vertical vector fields
on the tangent bundle, and the image of the family of kinematical vector fields is the affine space
of second-order vector fields. Thus, the kinematically possible evolutions of the dynamical system
are exactly the possible solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation posed on the tangent bundle of
the dynamical system’s configuration space. This completes the argument for the first claim of this
section: dynamical systems are Lagrangian.
We now consider the converse problem, as it were, whether in some sense having in hand some-
thing like a traditional Lagrangian representation of a classical system allows one to construct its
dynamical representation (in the sense of §§2–3). In fact we will pose the problem in the weakest
possible form, to lend correlative strength to the solution: how much, if at all, does the structure of
Lagrangian mechanics by itself, that is, the way that the Euler-Lagrange equation associates vector
fields with scalar fields, determine the structure of an abstract space of states as a tangent bundle
over configuration space? If the Lagrangian structure on its own does allow one to reconstruct an
abstract space of states as a tangent bundle over configuration space, then we can avail ourselves
of the reverse of the arguments that proved theorem 3.1 to show that the abstract space of states
must in fact be diffeomorphic to the dynamical space of states, that the configuration space of the
former is diffeomorphic to that of the latter, that the solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation on
the abstract space of states are the pre-images of the kinematical vector fields, and so on.
This is our problem: if one knew of the tangent bundle of configuration space merely as a
differentiable manifold, the abstract space of states (i.e., one did not know that it was a tangent
bundle at all, much more the tangent bundle of configuration space in particular), and one also knew
the Lagrangian dynamical vector field associated with any given Lagrangian—say one had a black
box that spat out the correct Lagrangian vector field three seconds after one fed a Lagrangian into
it—would this information alone suffice to reconstruct the abstract space of states as the tangent
bundle? If the answer is yes, then we could define a canonical isomorphism from it to the dynamical
17One can see it most easily in the geometrical formulation of Lagrangian mechanics; see Curiel (2009).
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space of states by fixing a distinguished vector field on it (presumably, the one representing the free
evolution of the system). Then the converse of the argument that proved the first assertion of this
section would show that to know how to give a completely abstract Lagrangian formulation of a
system on its abstract space of states would eo ipso suffice to reconstruct all the structure on the
space of states accruing to it as a dynamical system. In the event, the answer is yes.
To state somewhat precisely the theorem that answers the question, let the Euler-Lagrange
operator E be the (non-linear) functional that takes a scalar field to its associated Lagrangian vector
field on a manifold that supports the formulation of the Euler-Lagrange equation in the first place.
Theorem 4.1 A manifold has an Euler-Lagrange operator if and only if it is a tangent bundle over
another space; the operator’s action allows one to recover the space over which it is the tangent
bundle.
The theorem states, in other words, that not all manifolds admit the appropriate geometry for the
formulation of the Euler-Lagrange equation; see Curiel (2009) for a precise statement and proof of
the theorem.
Now all we need to do is to find a distinguished vector field on the tangent bundle that is the
analogue to the free kinematical vector field used in the proof of theorem 3.1. The solution to the
free Lagrangian is the obvious candidate, the unique solution for which the system experiences no
accelerations. It follows by construction that the solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equation map to
the kinematical vector fields on the space of states and the vertical vector fields map to the interaction
vector fields. This completes the argument for the second claim of this section: Lagrangian systems
are dynamical.
We can now give an alternate characterization of a dynamical system’s kinematical constraints
that will be useful in §5; it will at the same time show why quantities such as the one I mentioned
in footnote 10 can play no physically significant role in the representation of dynamical systems.
Recall that physical quantities, as scalar fields on the space of states, can be used to parametrize
the space of states in the sense of assigning values to every point so as to individuate them. The
kinematical constraints can be expressed as relations among quantities that any set of them must
satisfy in order that the quantities yield a parametrization of the space of states that satisfies the
kinematical constraints as originally formulated. Call such a set of quantities ‘appropriate’. Then
the kinematical constraints can be expressed by demanding that the only sets of physical quantities
appropriate for a parametrization are those such that half are configurative and the other half are
the velocital ones formed from the respective dynamical derivatives of those configurative ones.
Before moving on, it is worth remarking once again how strong and deep the results of this
section are with regard to our understanding of the physics of classical systems, understanding at
both the semantic and the cognitive levels. From the weak premises of §§2–3, themselves founded
on entrenched, firm empirical knowledge, we have deduced the fact that classical systems evince
the structure intrinsic to Lagrangian mechanics, nothing more and nothing less. This deduction
would not have been possible had we taken the theory of classical systems to consist only of its
family of models, as the semantical view of theories holds, for the constructions relied on structures
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global in the sense that one can formulate them only as relations among the entire family of models,
and fundamental in the sense that they are required for a complete account of the meaning of any
individual model in the first place, i.e., for the complete semantic interpretation of each of the
models.
5 Classical Systems Are Not Hamiltonian
In this section, I briefly review the geometry of Hamiltonian mechanics before discussing the ways
it represents classical systems. It will become clear almost immediately that Lagrangian models
and Hamiltonian models of the exact same systems in the exact same empirical regimes must have
different semantics, whether or not there is any physically significant structure the two models
isomorphically share. This already contravenes the semantical view of physical theories, because the
two models are of the same state of the same system, evolving in the same environment, coupled
with other systems in the same ways, etc.: they are not models in competing, mutually exclusive
theories, nor is one the approximation, in a preceding, superannuated theory, of another successor
theory, nor anything else of the like. Because the two models are not isomorphic in a strong sense,
however, the semantical view cannot attribute the same semantical content to them.
Now, a cotangent vector at a point on a manifold is a linear map from tangent vectors at that
point to real numbers. One can think of it as a generalized differential form. (Cotangent vectors are
also called ‘1-forms’.) The gradient of a function ∇H is an example of a 1-form—it takes a vector
and returns the number that measures the rate of change of the function in the direction the vector
determines. The set of all cotangent vectors at a point inherits the structure of a vector space from
the set of tangent vectors at the point. A cotangent vector field is a smooth assignment of cotangent
vectors to the points of the manifold. The cotangent bundle of a manifold is the same thing as the
tangent bundle except that instead of bundling the vector spaces of tangent vectors with each of
their respective points on the manifold, one bundles the vector spaces of cotangent vectors with each
of their respective points. Thus, a point of the cotangent bundle of configuration space consists of
a point of configuration space and a 1-form at the point.
It is well known that one requires only a symplectic structure to formulate Hamilton’s equation.
For our purposes, one can think of a symplectic structure as an anti-symmetric, invertible matrix.
Thus one can use it to define a map from pairs of vectors to scalars, from individual vectors to
individual 1-forms, and from individual 1-forms to individual vectors. Every cotangent bundle
comes equipped with a canonical symplectic structure, Ω. Hamilton’s equation is then
ξ = Ω(∇H) (5.1)
We call ξ the Hamiltonian vector field associated with the Hamiltonian H. (So in this case we
treat the symplectic structure as a map from an individual 1-form, ∇H, to an individual tangent
vector, ξ.) In order to recover the usual formulation in terms of coordinates, fix a natural coordinate
system (qi, pj) on the cotangent bundle. (The coordinate system is natural in the same sense as
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those on the tangent bundle: the pi are the components of the differential forms dqi generated by
the coordinates (qi) on configuration space.) In those coordinates, the symplectic structure is
dqi ∧ dpi
where ∧ is the exterior (anti-symmetric) product on 1-forms. Hamilton’s equation is then written
q˙j =
∂H
∂pj
p˙i = −∂H
∂qi
(5.2)
It is straightforward to check that a transformation of that coordinate system to any other natural
one preserves the form of the symplectic structure and so, a fortiori, of equations (5.2) as well. Even
though the formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics is often, implicitly, restricted to a phase space (i.e.,
space of states) isomorphic to a cotangent bundle over configuration space, this need not be the case;
any symplectic manifold (a manifold with a symplectic structure) will do. We therefore generalize
natural coordinates on a cotangent bundle to canonical coordinates on a symplectic manifold: a
coordinate system is canonical if Hamilton’s equations expressed in their terms has the form (5.2).
In a canonical coordinate system, the second half of the coordinates, the pi, represent momental
quantities, the analogue of the velocital quantities in dynamical systems (and Lagrangian mechanics).
That is why (qi, pi) represents a point of the cotangent bundle: the momentum of a free Newtonian
particle is an example of a momental quantity. Such quantities are naturally represented as 1-
forms rather than as vectors, as the velocital quantities are. One may wonder why this should
be so, especially in light of the fact that the momentum of a Newtonian particle is just mv, the
tangent vector representing its velocity multiplied by the scalar representing its mass—surely a scalar
multiplying a vector gives another vector and not a 1-form, and so it seems that (qi, pi) ought to
represent a point of the tangent bundle. To see why momental quantities are properly represented
by 1-forms, first note that the momentum of the particle can be naturally thought of as a linear map
from vectors to scalars: it is the map that takes the vector mv to the scalar 12mv
2, the particle’s
kinetic energy. This interpretation of the momentum may seem odd, too abstract, even unnatural
in the context of Newtonian mechanics, but in fact it is exactly what one needs to represent the
momental quantities of more complex systems that have more complex relations between the rate
of change of its velocities on the one hand and its momenta on the other. Angular momentum, e.g.,
is not the scalar product of the mass of a rotating body and the rate of change of its configuration.
The configuration of a cylinder spinning about its axis does not change at all, but it has non-zero
angular momentum. This angular momentum, moreover, does define a linear map from the angular
velocity of the cylinder to its rotational kinetic energy. Thus, a 1-form is the proper representation
for momental quantities, having the exact form required to capture the relation between generalized
momenta and generalized velocities. That is the physical meaning, the semantics, of momentum in
Hamiltonian mechanics. One can see this only by taking account of the global structure of the entire
theory, not by the examination of any single model.
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Now, the linearity of Hamilton’s equation implies that the space of all Hamiltonian vector fields
for all Hamiltonians is a vector space: the sum of two Hamiltonian vector fields associated with
two different Hamiltonians is itself the Hamiltonian vector field associated with the sum of the two
Hamiltonians, or, more formally, if
Ω(∇H1) = ξ1
Ω(∇H2) = ξ2
then
Ω(∇(H1 +H2)) = ξ1 + ξ2
A straightforward calculation shows, moreover, that the symplectic structure induces the structure
of a Lie algebra on that vector space, under the action of the regular Lie bracket of vector fields on a
manifold.18 In other words, the vector space of Hamiltonian vector fields is closed under the action
of the Lie bracket.
Now, these facts imply that the family of kinematically possible evolutions of a dynamical system,
in so far as they are characterized by interactions with no prior assumption of a geometrical structure
as in §3, cannot be naturally represented as Hamiltonian vector fields on phase space, for by definition
an affine space is not isomorphic to a Lie algebra over a vector space. It follows that there is
no analogous structure in the Hamiltonian representation of a system isomorphic to a dynamical
system’s family of interaction vector fields—because the family of Hamiltonian vector fields is not an
affine space, one has no way to characterize interactions as independent vector fields defined by the
difference between (a Hamiltonian representation of) two kinematical vector fields. One thus loses
the capacity to identify configuration space, which had better be the case since phase space may
not even be diffeomorphic to a cotangent bundle over configuration space. In consequence, not only
does the Hamiltonian formulation of a system not allow one to express the kinematical constraints
essential to dynamical systems, but it does not respect them, for it allows solutions to the equations
of motion that violate them in the sense that they cannot be the images of second-order vector fields
on the tangent bundle under a Legendre transform. (I discuss the Legendre transform in §6.)
Still, Hamiltonian mechanics does in fact impose its own kinematical constraints among its ana-
logues to configurative and momental quantities. Because quantities are just scalar fields on phase
space, we can reframe the idea as the imposition of kinematical constraints on its canonical coordi-
nates. Now, a symplectomorphism is an isometry of a symplectic structure, i.e., a diffeomorphism
of phase space that maps the symplectic structure to itself. Let us say that the coordinate vector
fields associated with a canonical coordinate system (e.g., ∂∂qi for the qi) are themselves canonical.
Then Hamiltonian mechanics demands of the family of canonical coordinates that all the associated
canonical vector fields generate symplectomorphisms (i.e., that the symplectic structure remain con-
stant along the flow-lines of the canonical coordinate axes). Indeed, a stronger statement holds: a
18A Lie algebra is an anti-symmetric, bilinear product of two vector fields that yields a third vector field; it also
satisfies the Jacobi identity. The exact definition is not important for our purposes, so if this isn’t clear to you, don’t
worry about it.
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coordinate system is canonical if and only if its associated coordinate vector fields are Hamiltonian
(i.e., are the solution to Hamilton’s equation for some Hamiltonian). That fact gives the precise
sense in which the quantities that compose a canonical coordinate system are preferred for the
parametrization of the space of states. This is the analogue in Hamiltonian mechanics of the ex-
pression in Lagrangian mechanics of its kinematical constraints by the proposition that the unit
vector fields generated by the natural coordinate systems are Lagrangian. One difference is that
not all Hamiltonian vector fields arise in this way (the zero vector field does not, e.g.), whereas all
Lagrangian vector fields do arise in that way. The family of canonical vector fields do, however, span
the vector space of all Hamiltonian vector fields.
It will prove useful to have besides the first two another necessary and sufficient condition for a
set of quantities to form a canonical coordinate system. A Poisson bracket, roughly speaking, is an
anti-symmetric, bilinear map from pairs of scalar fields to scalar fields that acts in effect like a kind
of derivative, measuring the respective rates of change of each function with respect to those of the
other. One arises naturally from the symplectic structure Ω: the bracket for two scalar fields f and
g is given by
{f, g} ≡ Ω(∇f, ∇g)
(Here, we treat the symplectic structure as a map from pairs of 1-forms to scalar fields.) Then a
coordinate system (qi, pj) is canonical if and only if
{qi, qj} = 0
{qi, pj} = δij
{pi, pj} = 0
(5.3)
where δij is the Kronecker delta symbol, which equals 1 for i = j and 0 otherwise. This is a far weaker
condition than demanding that the momental quantities be dynamical derivatives of the configurative
ones, the analogue of the kinematical constraint demanded by Lagrangian mechanics. Even if phase
space is diffeomorphic to a cotangent bundle, for example, one can see by inspection that the
constraints allow us to apply a symplectomorphism that does not respect the bundle structure but
mixes up the ps and the qs while preserving the form of the symplectic structure. (The simplest
one just swaps qi and pi—Hamiltonian mechanics doesn’t care whether you mind your ps and qs.)
In consequence, Hamiltonian mechanics does not respect the kinematical constraints that relate
configurative and momental quantities in dynamical systems.
One can think of these facts as a way to make precise the idea that configurative quantities and
configuration space itself play no distinguished role in Hamiltonian mechanics: one has no tools
available to distinguish them in a physically significant way. That makes physical sense, for the
symplectic structure, unlike the geometry of the tangent bundle, does not allow one to reconstruct
the space on which it resides as a cotangent bundle—any even-dimensional, orientable manifold can
support one. There is no Hamiltonian form of theorem 4.1.
From a certain perspective, then, Lagrangian mechanics appears to be the more fundamental
of the two ways of representing systems in classical analytical mechanics, in the sense that one
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natural way to describe a dynamical system is by a manifold and two families of vector fields with
appropriate structure, and it so happens that these these are equivalent to Lagrangian mechanics.
This is not meant to be a mathematically derived a priori proposition, but rather one deduced from
a claim about actual classical systems, that their kinematical vector fields always form affine spaces
over vector spaces of fields that represent interactions. It is not inconceivable that it could have
been the other way, that observation would have shown that the set of kinematical vector fields of
classical dynamical systems had the structure of a real Lie algebra based on a symplectic structure.
In this case, one presumes, an analogous argument would have shown that Hamiltonian mechanics
was the more fundamental in this sense. In fact, to try to do so will allow us to formulate and sketch
the proof of the closest analogue in Hamiltonian mechanics to theorem 4.1.
It is instructive to think about this idea in more detail by trying to recapitulate for Hamiltonian
mechanics the analogue of the arguments of §3, to see whether we can recover the Hamiltonian
symplectic structure starting with the fundamental elements anologous to those we used in the
construction of configuration space for dynamical systems. In the event, we can. I give the quick
and dirty version.
Let there be given an abstract space of states, a family of kinematical vector fields on it and a
set of kinematical constraints. (Behind the curtain, these are really the Hamiltonian structures—
the family of kinematical vector fields in this case forms a vector space, for instance—but we do
not yet know any of that.) We first determine the class of vector fields that represent possible
interactions by requiring, as in the dynamical case, that the addition of an interaction to a possible
evolution yield another possible evolution, as seems plausible on physical grounds. It follows that the
interaction vector fields for Hamiltonian mechanics are identical with the Hamiltonian vector fields,
because the Hamiltonian vector fields themselves already (behind the scenes) form a vector space.
By assumption, therefore, we can discover in the same way as we did for dynamical systems, by
physical probing, observation and generalization, that the family of interaction vector fields on the
abstract space of states is identical to the family of kinematical vector fields. Since we demand that
the addition of an interaction vector field to a kinematically possible one yield another kinematically
possible one, we conclude that the kinematical vector fields form a vector space.
Now, that all canonical vector fields are Hamiltonian implies that every vector at a point of phase
space is a member of some Hamiltonian vector field: you give me a point of phase space and a vector
at it, and I can produce a Hamiltonian vector field that takes that vector as its value at that point.
(In other words, there are no restrictions on what counts as good initial-data for the Hamiltonian
initial-value problem.) By assumption, therefore, every vector at every point of the abstract space of
states is a member of some kinematical vector field, which we can discover by physical probing. We
say in this case that the vector space of vector fields spans the tangent planes. (This does not imply
that the fixed vector space of kinematical vector fields spans the vector space of all vector fields on
the manifold; there are vector fields that cannot be written as a linear sum of fields in the vector
space of canonical vector fields.) It follows that starting from any point we can reach any nearby
point to first-order in some kinematically possible evolution, i.e., good initial data for the equation
of motion consists of a point of the space of states and any tangent vector at that point. (One can
Erik Curiel 22 September 27, 2009
Lagrangian, Not Hamiltonian
also think of this as saying, roughly speaking, that any allowable evolution can be perturbed to any
other by changes of no order higher than the first.) Thus, the equation of motion itself must be
first-order; that it is linear follows from the fact that it must respect the kinematical constraints,
which we know by assumption, because the constraints themselves respect the vector-space structure
of the kinematical vector fields. We do not yet know, however, what types of entities the equation
of motion is formulated in terms of—is it a map from vector fields to vector fields, or from scalar
fields or collections of tensor fields to them? And so on. We know only that the equation of motion
is encoded in some linear map from some family of entities to the Hamiltonian vector fields.
To address this question, we invoke the given kinematical constraints (which, recall, are really the
Hamiltonian ones). By assumption, we know that the elements of any preferred coordinate system
satisfy {qi, pi} = 1. We use this to define a map Ω from pairs of canonical vector fields to scalar
fields:
Ω(
∂
∂qi
,
∂
∂qj
) ≡ {qi, qj} = 0
Ω(
∂
∂qi
,
∂
∂pj
) ≡ {qi, pj} = δij
Ω(
∂
∂pi
,
∂
∂pj
) ≡ {pi, pj} = 0
(5.4)
Restricting consideration to a single point, invoking the linearity and anti-symmetry of the Poisson
bracket, and noting that the vectors ∂∂qi and
∂
∂pj
span the tangent-space at that point, we conclude
that Ω is a bilinear, non-degenerate, anti-symmetric, linear map from pairs of vectors to scalars.
In other words, it is a 2-index, anti-symmetric, invertible covariant tensor, otherwise known as a
2-form, and so we now write it emboldened, ‘Ω’, to honor our convention; one can think of it as
an invertible, anti-symmetric matrix. Now extend it to a tensor field on a neighborhood of the
fixed point by sweeping it along the flow-lines of the canonical vector fields; this guarantees that
the canonical vector fields generate isometries of the 2-form. To see that the resulting tensor field is
closed, and so a symplectic structure, it suffices to compute its components in the given canonical
coordinate system, which turn out to be constant.
Another simple computation shows that the canonical coordinates and vector fields satisfy the
equations
Ω(∇qi) = − ∂
∂pi
and
Ω(∇pi) = ∂
∂qi
One cannot yet think of these as instances of Hamilton’s equation, since the relations are so far
confirmed only for canonical coordinates and vector fields. Linearity and the fact that the canonical
vector fields span the space of all Hamiltonian vector fields, however, jointly imply that the vector
space of all Hamiltonian vector fields is the space of solutions to equations of that form for arbitrary
scalar fields. Thus Ω(∇ · ) is the first-order, linear operator that encodes the equation of motion
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for all Hamiltonian vector fields, answering our question: the equation of motion takes a scalar field
and returns a Hamiltonian vector field. Now it is Hamilton’s equation.
This proves a weak analogue to theorem 4.1.
Theorem 5.1 Fix an even-dimensional, orientable manifold with a vector space of vector fields on
it and a Poisson bracket structure. Then the Poisson bracket arises from a symplectic structure and
the vector space includes all and only solutions to Hamilton’s equation formulated with it if and only
if the vector space spans the tangent planes, and the manifold has a group of coordinate systems
whose coordinate functions satisfy the relations (5.3) and whose associated coordinate vector fields
leave the vector space invariant under the action of the Lie bracket.
The theorem is weaker than 4.1 in so far as it imposes no topological form on phase space.
To sum up, we have discovered that the semantics of the appropriate quantities is different
in Hamiltonian mechanics from those in Lagrangian mechanics. We have seen that the family
of Hamiltonian vector fields is not isomorphic to the family of a dynamical system’s kinematical
vector fields, and that Hamiltonian mechanics does not allow one to define an isomorphic analogue
to the interaction vector fields of a dynamical system. Because the dynamical space of states is
diffeomorphic to TC, moreover, and that itself is diffeomorphic to T ∗C, though not canonically
so, it follows that the dynamical space of states is also diffeomorphic to T ∗C, though again not
canonically so. Because one can do Hamiltonian mechanics on any symplectic manifold, however,
there are Hamiltonian systems whose phase spaces are not diffeomorphic to the space of states of
any dynamical system, viz., phase spaces that are not cotangent bundles. An example of this occurs
in the formulation of the Euler equations of motion for a rigid body as a Hamiltonian system: to
construct phase space in this case, one takes the cotangent bundle of the group of spatial rotations
and constructs its quotient by the same group of rotations; this space carries a canonical symplectic
structure, and Hamilton’s equation formulated in its terms is equivalent to Euler’s equation written in
ordinary configurative and momental coordinates. (See, e.g., Arnold 1978, pp. 318–330, appendix 2.)
Finally, and most important, the kinematical constraints of the two frameworks do not encode
isomorphic relations. Thus, dynamical systems, in so far as they are Lagrangian, are in no way
Hamiltonian, and Hamiltonian ones are not dynamical.
6 How Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics Respectively
Represent Classical Systems
The arguments and conclusions of the previous two sections raise (at least) four deep questions.
1. If Hamiltonian mechanics does not respect the kinematical constraints intrinsic to dynamical
systems, how can it provide adequate representations of classical systems (e.g., the simple
harmonic oscillator)?
2. Why does Lagrangian mechanics always respect the constraints of dynamical systems?
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3. Because we know the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations to be related by the Legen-
dre transform, what happens in the passage from Lagrangian to Hamiltonian mechanics that
expunges respect for those constraints?
4. Is any structure in Hamiltonian mechanics isomorphic to any structure in Lagrangian mechan-
ics?
I start with the first.
In order to apply Hamiltonian mechanics to model dynamical systems, we have to impose the
kinematical constraints of a dynamical system more or less by hand. We do this without explicit
remark in ordinary practice, by restricting attention to that small class of Hamiltonians that do in
fact model dynamical systems, viz., those that satisfy pi . q˙j—that the pi are linear functions of
the qj , the kinematical relation between momentum and velocity we expect for classical systems.
This condition is weak enough to represent the relation, for instance, between the rate of change of
configuration to both linear momentum and to angular momentum, and no weaker.
It follows from Hamilton’s equation that for this relation to hold H must be a second-degree
homogeneous formula in the pi, i.e., it must satisfy
∂H
∂pi
. pj (6.1)
which in turn implies
H = αmnpmpn + U(qj) (6.2)
where U and every αmn is each an arbitrary function of the configurative quantities only. Indeed,
in the examples we are familiar with from text-books, all the αmn are constants (not necessarily all
the same), and we must in fact restrict ourselves to this case. In general, that a Hamiltonian has
this restricted form implies that half of the relations in the coordinate formulation of Hamilton’s
equation, viz.,
∂H
∂pi
= q˙i (6.3)
become physical tautologies, in the sense that they serve only to represent the kinematical constraints
of the dynamical system, pi . q˙i. Thus, that a Hamiltonian has the form (6.2), where all the αmn
are constants, is the necessary and sufficient condition for it to model a dynamical system.
Hamiltonians of any other form do not do this. H = 12pip
i +
∑
j pj is a funny one. It gives
p˙i = 0 for the dynamics, like a free system, but q˙i = pi + 1, which makes no physical sense: the
constant number 1 does not have the dimensions of a velocity. (Another way to make the point: for
“q˙i = pi + 1” to make physical sense, there would have to be a canonically distinguished system of
units one had to use to express values of position and momentum; otherwise one would get different
actual magnitudes for q˙i depending on whether one used cm/s or km/h.) H = 12pip
i + 16 (pip
i)3/2
gives even stranger behavior. It yields
vi ≡ ∂H
∂pi
= pi +
1
4
pip
i
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Solving this quadratic equation for pi in terms of vi gives
pi =
−1± (1 + vi)1/2
2
Thus, there are two possible solutions for pi, both of which are complex for values vi < −1. It
follows that the Lagrangian one gets from using this H to define the inverse-Legendre transform is
also complex for those values of vi, and so a fortiori is not a second-order vector field on the tangent
bundle. It is impossible to make physical sense of any of this in the realm of the classical world.
Thus Hamiltonian mechanics represents dynamical systems only in so far as we restrict ourselves
to a sub-family of all the formally acceptable Hamiltonians by the ad hoc use of conditions foreign
to Hamiltonian mechanics itself, for its structures do not provide the appropriate concepts and tools
to formulate in their terms the required strictures that treat configurative quantities differently from
momental, nor do they provide any natural justification for the restriction to Hamiltonians of the
form (6.2).
Now, to address the second question listed at the beginning of the section, recall that a curve on
the space of states satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation if and only if it extremizes the variation of
the standard action integral. More precisely, the traditional formulation of Lagrangian mechanics
poses the following problem:
Given a function L(qi, q˙i) of the coordinates and their time-derivatives on configuration
space C, to find a family of curves {γλ}λ∈Λ for some indexing set Λ such that every
curve in the family is an extremal, in the sense of the calculus of variations, of the action
functional
A[γ] =
∫
γ
L(γ(t), γ˙(t)) dt
where γ˙(t) is the vector tangent to γ at parameter-value t.
We know already from §4 that any extremal curve γ must be the canonical lift of a curve from con-
figuration space to its tangent bundle; this is just another restatement of the Lagrangian constraints.
What happens if we attempt to drop this restriction? Consider the following completely general
variational problem:
Given the scalar field L on a manifold N, to find a family of curves {γλ}λ∈Λ on N for
some indexing set Λ, such that through each point of N exactly one curve passes, and
each curve γλ in the family is an extremal of the action functional
S[γ] =
∫
γ
L(γ(t)) dt
This problem has no non-trivial solution. If the integral must have an extremal value in every
direction, and not just those directions transverse to those associated with lifts from configuration
space, so to speak, then, roughly speaking, its derivative must be zero in every direction, which
implies that the scalar field L must be a constant, and so every curve on the space of states is a
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solution.19 This result is explained by the fact that, locally, all smooth vector fields, and so all well
behaved families of curves, look exactly alike. If you’ve seen one, you’ve seen ’em all. This is why
variational problems over unrestricted families of curves have no non-trivial solutions. That one
is able to find non-trivial solutions to Lagrangian-type problems has to do with the fact that one
derives the Euler-Lagrange equation not by considering variations over arbitrary curves but only over
curves that are canonical lifts on the tangent bundle, i.e., curves along which half the coordinates
are the dynamical derivatives of the other half—curves along which the kinematical constraints of a
dynamical system are respected.20
Thus, it is built into Lagrangian mechanics from the start, by necessity, that the kinematical
constraints of dynamical systems be respected—one cannot even formulate the theory without it—
that is to say, one could not even derive the Euler-Lagrange equation from a variational principle.
Not only this, though—it also builds in from the start that the Lagrangian must be quadratic (at
least) in the velocities for there to be a unique solution, i.e., that the Lagrangian be regular as
defined by the relation (4.4). One can see this from the fact that the variational problem will not
be well posed unless one can take non-trivial derivatives of the Lagrangian up to second-order in
the velocity, since the crucial integration by parts that yields the Euler-Lagrange equation demands
this, on pain of giving, e.g., the tautology 0 = 0 (for, say, the Lagrangian L = kivi for a constant
vector k) or the contradiction 1 = 0 (for, say, the Lagrangian L = kiqi, for constant ki). This again
stands in contradistinction to the case of Hamiltonian mechanics, in which one must impose the
quadratic form of the Hamiltonian as an ad hoc condition.
We now address the third question, what happens in the passage from a Lagrangian to a Hamilto-
nian representation of a dynamical system by way of the Legendre transform: why does the structure
of a dynamical system (in the sense of §§2–3) not get preserved? Fix a natural coordinate system
(qi, vj) on the tangent bundle, and let (qi, pj) be the natural coordinate system on the cotangent
bundle based on the same configuration coordinates (qi). Then for a given Lagrangian L, the action
of the Legendre transform—the natural mapping that takes a Lagrangian model of a system to a
Hamiltonian one—is fixed in these coordinates by the condition that vi 7→ ∂L
∂vi
≡ pi, providing a
map from TM to T ∗M. (Thus the condition that a Lagrangian be regular, equation (4.4), guarantees
that the pi form good coordinates on the cotangent bundle.)
In order to see why the affine-space structure of the Lagrangian vector fields does not survive
the transform, we need to determine what an arbitrary second-order vector field maps to. What
happens, for example, to non-physical second-order vector fields when they are mapped to the
cotangent bundle? Consider the field
ξ = vi
(
∂
∂qi
)
+ vj
(
∂
∂vj
)
(6.4)
19It is not difficult to make this argument precise and rigorous.
20In the usual derivation of the Euler-Lagrange equations (e.g., Rosenberg 1977, chapter 9), this restriction allows
the switching of the order of differentiation and variation of certain terms that in turn allows the crucial integration
by parts; the nature and origin of the requirement is masked in that case by the traditional presentation in terms of
an arbitrary coordinate system and the lack of recognition that the Lagrangian is a scalar field on TC not on C.
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This represents a system whose acceleration increases in proportion to its velocity, which is to say
that its velocity exponentially increases, and so it will be highly unstable and shoot off to infinity in
a finite amount of time at the slightest provocation.21 Mapping the vector field (6.4) to T ∗C using
the Legendre transform ΛL defined by L = 12viv
i, a manifestly physical Lagrangian,22 we get
ξˆ = ΛL[ξ] = pi
∂
∂qi
+ pj
∂
∂pj
It is easy to see that this cannot be a Hamiltonian vector field on physical grounds: because p˙j = pj ,
this system would not conserve energy. (It would represent a system that goes hurtling off to infinity
in a finite time with exponentially increasing velocity.) Thus, the Legendre transform does not map
all Lagrangian vector fields to Hamiltonian ones.
What happens to Hamiltonians that don’t respect the Lagrangian kinematical constraints when
they get sent back to the Lagrangian formulation via the inverse-Legendre transform? Consider the
Hamiltonian H = p. This yields a well defined Hamiltonian problem, with the Hamiltonian vector
field
q˙ = 1
p˙ = 0
This seems to represent a free particle moving with velocity 1. If you try to perform a reverse
Legendre transform to put it into Lagrangian form, then you get q˙ = 1 and L = vp − H = q˙ − 1,
which does not yield a well-set Lagrangian problem—more precisely, it yields the identity 0 = 0
when you plug L into the Euler-Lagrange equation.
The Legendre transform does not respect the kinematical constraints of Lagrangian mechanics
because it, in effect, wipes out any notion of verticality—the idea that the interaction vector fields are
different from the kinematical vector fields, and yet define their algebraic structure—in so far as the
idea of verticality is defined by the difference of two second-order vector fields on the tangent bundle,
in virtue of the affine-space structure of the second-order vector fields. In wiping out verticality, it
also wipes out the kinematical link between change of position and the momental quantity used to
formulate the equation of motion, and the associated link between the kinematical constraints and
the form of allowable interactions for dynamical systems. One can make a stronger statement: any
physically significant transformation of a Lagrangian representation of a system into a Hamiltonian
one must wipe out verticality: Hamiltonian mechanics cannot be formulated with it, as Lagrangian
mechanics cannot be formulated without it.
Still, even in the face of all the contravening evidence I have marshaled, one might think or even
hope that restricting attention to the “physical” Hamiltonians, those that satisfy the relation (6.2),
might allow us to recover the structures of a dynamical system in a natural way. This suggestion
21This is an example of a second-order vector field that is not the solution to any Lagrangian for the homogeneous
Euler-Lagrange equation; one must use the inhomogeneous form, by including (non-conservative) general forces, to
find a Lagrangian that has this as the solution.
22And, in fact, this L is a Lagrangian that yields the vector field (6.4) as a solution with the appropriate generalized
forces.
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leads us to address the fourth and final question we posed on page 24. In fact, there is a promising
start to the address of the suggestion: although it is next to impossible to see by looking only at the
coordinate-form of the Euler-Lagrange equation, viz., equation (4.3), the Euler-Lagrange equation
does in fact contain a closed, invertible 2-form—a symplectic structure, in seeming analogy with
Hamiltonian mechanics—as part of the equation’s construction, as we intimated immediately after
the condition (4.4). It is not a fixed symplectic structure as in Hamiltonian mechanics, however, but
rather it itself depends on the Lagrangian, and so it differs in different instances of the Euler-Lagrange
equation. This stands in opposition to the case in Hamiltonian mechanics where the symplectic
structure is independent of the Hamiltonian. I will discuss the significance of this difference in
§7, where I argue that this seeming sameness of structure does not support the semantical view of
physical theories, because the formally isomorphic structures play different semantical roles in each
framework.
There is one more possibility for defending the semantical view against these arguments. Most
of the examples and arguments so far have treated only the kinematical structures of theories. I
now briefly address the question whether Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics share physically
significant structure in their dynamics. In fact, the question has a simple answer. The models of
individual systems such as the equation of motion for a simple harmonic oscillator in Hamiltonian
Mechanics will not be isomorphic to the model for the same system in Lagrangian mechanics, for all
the reasons given here. That the global kinematics possess no common structures necessitates that
individual models do not either, for the global kinematical structures provides the scaffolding for the
construction of the equations of motion. Indeed, that is the significance of the difference between
theorems 4.1 and 5.1.
One reflection of this, for instance, is the fact that Hamilton’s equation must be first-order
and the Euler-Lagrange equation second-order. The former proposition was derived in the proof
of theorem 5.1. The latter is suggested by the following argument (which can be made rigorous—
see Curiel 2009). For an arbitrary vector field ζ on the tangent bundle, there always exist three
second-order vector fields ξ, η and θ such that
ζ = θ − [ξ, η] (6.5)
We already expect that a kinematically possible evolution connects any two points on the space of
states. (If not, then we could divide the space of states into pieces not reachable from each other
by any dynamical evolution, and thus that would prima facie represent “different systems”.) Then
equation (6.5) states, roughly speaking, that we can get from any point in the dynamical space
of states to any nearby point “to order no higher than second” along the kinematically possible
evolutions. Not every two nearby points in the tangent bundle, i.e., the space of states, are connected
by a kinematically possible vector field, because nearby points on the tangent bundle can be separated
in directions other than those picked out by the second-order vector fields. This reflects the fact
that only evolutions that respect the constraints are kinematically possible, and not all curves on the
tangent bundle respect the constraints. On the Hamiltonian space of states, however, every point
is connected to every nearby point by a kinematically possible vector field, reflecting the fact that
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there are no functional constraints among the configurative and momental quantities that reduce
the dimensionality of the family of their compossible evolutions. Thus, the dynamical structures of
the theories, as encoded in the equations of motion, cannot be isomorphic either.
It will be useful for the arguments of §7 to make this last point concrete by means of a simple
example, the simple harmonic oscillator. For simplicity, I assume the system is one-dimensional (i.e.,
it can move only in one dimension and so has two degrees of freedom in my sense) and has its mass
equal to 1 and its coefficient of elasticity equal to 1/2. Then the Hamiltonian is
H =
1
2
p2 +
1
2
q2
and Hamilton’s equations are
q˙ =
∂H
∂p
= p
p˙ = −∂H
∂q
= −q
(6.6)
which has as its phase-portrait (i.e., the integral curves to the associated Hamiltonian vector field)
the expected circle on phase space as represented by a Cartesian plane. If we use H to define the
inverse-Legendre transform and so pass to the Lagrangian formulation, we get as expected
v ≡ ∂H
∂p
= p
for the velocity, yielding the expected Lagrangian
L ≡ pv −H
= v2 − 1
2
p2 − 1
2
q2
=
1
2
v2 − 1
2
q2
This is a regular Lagrangian, having as its solution the second-order vector field
q˙ = v
v˙ = −q
(6.7)
whose integral curves are essentially the same circles as in the Hamiltonian solution, only now on the
tangent bundle (represented as the Cartesian plane); in other words, the integral curves representing
the evolution of the system in the two frameworks are isomorphic to each other.
At first sight, the relations (6.6) and (6.7) appear in perfect agreement with each other. In-
deed, the perfection of the apparent agreement makes it difficult to see how the general claims of
the previous paragraphs could be true, that the dynamics of the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian
frameworks do not have physically significant isomorphic structures. I put off until §7 the argument
that the sets of relations (6.6) and (6.7), though apparently the same in form, do not in fact have
the same semantic content. For now, let us restrict attention to the way the solutions for the simple
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harmonic oscillator change under small perturbations. This will illustrate the physical significance of
the difference in the respective orders of the equations of motion in the two frameworks (first-order
for Hamiltonian, second-order for Lagrangian).
We expect on physical grounds that a slight perturbation to the forces acting on the system
should yield an evolution quite close to the original. Consider, then, the Hamiltonian
H ′ =
1
2
p2 +
1
2
q2 − p
for 1  > 0. Hamilton’s equations give
q˙ = p− 
p˙ = −q
(6.8)
For  small enough, this will be as close to a circle as one likes, for any reasonable sense of ‘close’.
Now, however, we are faced with a dilemma. If we use the inverse-Legendre transform defined by
the perturbed Hamiltonian, then the derived Lagrangian system is unphysical in the sense that it
does not respect the kinematical constraint v ≡ q˙ = p; rather,
v ≡ q˙ ∂H
′
∂p
= p− 
If we enforce the kinematical constraint v = p (say, by using the Hamiltonian of the ordinary simple
harmonic oscillator to define the Legendre transform), then the derived Lagrangian in this case has
the form
L′ =
1
2
v2 − 1
2
q2 + v + 2
for which, it is easily checked, the Lagrangian vector field is exactly equivalent to that for an ordinary
simple harmonic oscillator, which is not isomorphic to the non-circular, perturbed Hamiltonian
solution. In other words, the Lagrangian vector field in this case is not isomorphic to the Hamiltonian
vector field. (We ignore, for the sake of argument, the fact that it is not clear from a physical point
of view what it means to use the inverse-Legendre transform defined by another Hamiltonian to map
a solution of a given Hamiltonian to a Lagrangian formulation.)
The divergence of the solutions in this case can be explained by the difference in the order
of the fundamental equations and the difference in the kinematical constraints in the respective
frameworks. That Hamilton’s equation is first-order guarantees that one can reach from any point
in phase space to any nearby point directly along a Hamiltonian vector field simply by perturbing
any given Hamiltonian; because the point is reached along a Hamiltonian vector field, moreover, it
follows a fortiori that the Hamiltonian kinematical constraints are not violated. Because the Euler-
Lagrange equation is second-order, one cannot do this while preserving the Lagrangian kinematical
constraints.
[*** Geroch (lecture notes on geometrical formulation of quantummechanics, “math-physics/other-
minds/geroch/qm/geroch-geom-qm.pdf”, §18, pp. 47) shows that one can derive the quantum Hamil-
tonian from the classical one unambiguously, according to the “standard” method, when and only
when the classical Hamiltonian is regular, i.e., quadratic in momentum; see his discussion there ***]
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7 A Counter-Example to the Semantical View of Physical
Theory
In order to draw out the full philosophical relevance of the technical arguments of the previous
sections, I first sum them up.
1. the global structures of a theory of classical systems, as characterized in §§2–3, are necessary
and sufficient to give the theory a Lagrangian formulation
2. those structures do not permit one to recover a Hamiltonian formulation
3. none of the fundamental, global kinematical structures of Lagrangian mechanics is isomorphic
to any in Hamiltonian mechanics
4. in consequence, the dynamical structures of the two are not isomorphic in any way that pre-
serves semantical content
5. in futher consequence, no individual model in one shares physically significant, fundamental
structure with any in the other, even when the two are models of exactly the same classical
system
These facts, I shall argue, imply that the semantical view of physical theories, in the forms it has
been propounded, cannot be correct.
van Fraassen (1980, p. 64) concisely sums up what I take to be the three fundamental tenets of
the semantical view:23
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and secondly, to
specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as candidates for the
direct representation of observable phenomena. The structures which can be described in
experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances: the theory is empirically
adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical
substructures of that model.
I think this constitutes a minimal construal of the semantical view. This is shown by the fact that
philosophers as dramatically different in their goals and metaphysical and epistemological predilec-
tions as Suppes, Suppe, and Worrall, inter multa alia, in essence endorse the tenets.
These tenets have a simple implication that will ground my argument: if two theories appropri-
ately and adequately represent the same physical systems under the same conditions in the same
regimes, then the relevant structures in the models of each should be isomorphic to each other, since
they are both, ex hypothesi, isomorphic to the same empirical structure. Any particular account of
the semantical view can have as sophisticated, nuanced and clever a view of the relations between
theoretical and empirical structures as it wants, but in so far as at bottom it endorses those tenets,
23Italics are van Fraassen’s.
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it cannot be correct. The case of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics provides, I shall argue, a
decisive counter-example to the third fundamental tenet, that the semantics of a model (and so, by
the lights of the semantical view, of a theory) is founded on isomorphism of theoretical and empirical
structures. The explanation of the details of the way the case works as a counter-example, moreover,
will at the same time show why the first tenet cannot be correct: a theory neither is nor can be
fully characterized by its family of models. (If the first and the third tenet are not correct, then the
second is not so much incorrect as irrelevant.)
Now, when two theories provide good models of the same system, the semantical view demands
that sameness of meaning for the models implies sameness of structure between them. But that does
not always happen. The Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian models of the simple harmonic oscillator
mean the same thing, but there is no meaningful sameness of structure. The two models agree on all
empirical propositions both theories can formulate about it but the formal entities and relations that
inform the semantic content of the propositions are heteromorphic. The two models, for example,
agree on the following empirical proposition P: “the position and velocity of the simple harmonic
oscillator jointly satisfy the kinematical constraints essential to dynamical systems, viz., that its
velocity is the temporal derivative of its position”. Both the structures one uses to formulate P
and the grounds for its truth, however, could not be more different between the two frameworks.
In Lagrangian mechanics, the proposition is a necessary truth, in the sense that every Lagrangian
system satisfies it by construction; it is not a prediction in the framework about the possible be-
havior of a system, but rather a pre-condition that systems must satisfy in order for Lagrangian
mechanics to model them appropriately. In Hamiltonian mechanics, the proposition is not even true
in most models, much more necessarily true for all. Hamiltonian mechanics predicts that a simple
harmonic oscillator satisfy the kinematical constraints of a dynamical system; it does not require it
as a pre-condition for its propriety as a representation of the thing. In Lagrangian mechanics, the
relation that makes the proposition true is encoded in a global, fundamental, kinematical structure
that defines the kinematics of every model, viz., the algebra encoded in the family of models repre-
senting all possible evolutions. In Hamiltonian mechanics, it is encoded in the idiosyncratic form of a
particular Hamiltonian, the local dynamics of that particular model. This explains why the example
of the simple harmonic oscillator worked out at the end of §6 does not provide grist for the seman-
tical theorist’s mill. Even though the formal representation of the motion of the simple harmonic
oscillator, as integral curves of the kinematical vector field on the respective space of states, is the
same in both frameworks, the semantical content of the details of the representation are different.
The models in the two frameworks make the same set of empirical propositions about the simple
harmonic oscillator true; in that sense, each represents the system as having the same evolution as
does the other; but the two do not make the same predictions about the system, precisely because
q˙ = v is analytic in one and not a prediction, but is a prediction in the other. A fortiori, they cannot
make the same predictions.
A finer analysis puts the point more trenchantly. Strictly speaking, one cannot even formulate
the proposition P in the framework of Hamiltonian mechanics, because the framework does not
differentiate between configuration-like and velocity-like quantities. The constraints for dynamical
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systems, however, treat configuration and velocity asymmetrically. Thus, one cannot define a pred-
icate in Hamiltonian terms that represents the constraints. There is still, however, an obvious and
important sense in which P is not only meaningful in but true of the Hamiltonian model of the
simple harmonic oscillator: there is a unique, true proposition Q (the relations 6.6) in Hamiltonian
mechanics whose translation into Lagrangian terms by the inverse-Legendre transform is (the La-
grangian formulation of) P (the relations 6.7). Of course, this translation works, i.e., is physically
significant, only when the Hamiltonian is restricted by ad hoc measures to take the form (6.2).
Sameness of meaning, then, does not imply sameness of structure. Neither is the converse slogan
true. To ground a semantics, the things that are isomorphic must mean the same things in their
respective isomorphic systems, must play the same roles. The only structure formally isomorphic
in the two frameworks has different physical significance, and so different semantic content, in each
one. The canonical symplectic structure in Hamiltonian mechanics plays three semantical roles:
it encodes all the kinematical constraints; it ensures existence and uniqueness of solutions to the
equation of motion; and it ensures that energy (the Hamiltonian) is conserved during the course of
possible evolutions. It plays those roles in every model, moreover, independently of the dynamics of
any particular model, in the sense that it is independent of the Hamiltonian, and is rather fixed once
and for all, the same for all Hamiltonian models. Thus the Hamiltonian symplectic structure encodes
all and only the theory’s kinematics for all its models; the Hamiltonian of a particular model encodes
all and only the dynamics of that model and that model alone. In Lagrangian mechanics, to the
contrary, only some models have a symplectic structure, those whose associated Lagrangians satisfy
a particular condition, relation (4.4), and in those models the symplectic structure’s only function
is to ensure existence and uniqueness of solutions to the equation of motion. It encodes none of
the kinematical constraints, and it does not ensure conservation of energy. Its role in guaranteeing
existence and uniqueness, moreover, depends on the dynamics of the particular model, in so far as
the Lagrangian symplectic structure of a particular model is a function of the model’s Lagrangian
itself (if the model’s Lagrangian satisfies the relevant condition in the first place). In Lagrangian
mechanics, therefore, much of the kinematics is encoded in the algebraic structure of the space of
possible evolutions, but some is encoded in the Lagrangian for each model as well; the dynamics of
an individual model is still encoded entirely in the Lagrangian, but now it is not alone.
Still, there is a strong intuition that, just because the two render the same gross representations
of the evolution of a large class of systems, which is to say, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian models yield
the same form for the predicted evolution (as for the simple harmonic oscillator), it must follow that
the two have some physically significant, isomorphic structure. Agreement in prediction, however,
simply does not imply the existence of isomorphic, physically significant structure. Even when there
are isomorphic, physically significant structures, moreover, as I emphasized above, they need not
have the same semantic content, because they may play different roles in the representation of the
physical system. The only way to deny this conclusion is to claim that sameness of solutions to
equations of motion by itself—mere sameness in brute prediction—ensures sameness of semantical
content, but that is nothing more than the most naive form of verificationist empiricism. Mere
existence of isomorphisms between mathematical structures, then, cannot ground a semantics of
Erik Curiel 34 September 27, 2009
Lagrangian, Not Hamiltonian
physical theory: just because two theories model the same systems and have isomorphic structures
it does not follow that the empirical meaning of the isomorphic structures are the same in the two
theories—the physical roles the structures play in one theory may be distributed differently among
the isomorphic structures in the other theory, so to speak, or even among entirely different structures
in no way isomorphic to any in the other.
It is now clear why the first tenet of the semantical view cannot be correct as well: Tarskian (or
Beth, as the case may be) semantics is not adequate for physical theories. The argument has shown
that one can discover the profound differences between the semantics of the two theories only by
examination of the global structures of the theory, not by the study of any individual model. The
semantics of individual models on their own do not suffice for the comprehension of the semantics of
their fundamental building blocks such as the preferred quantities by means of which states are to be
individuated and identified and which in their internal structure encode the kinematical constraints
appropriate for each framework. Relations that hold jointly among all the theory’s models must be
taken account of—one gets the affine structure of a dynamical system’s kinematical vector fields, for
instance, only by treating the collection of models as a unified space with its own global structure.
In particular, one cannot define the space of interaction vector fields when one restricts attention to
the collection of models in isolation from any global structure imposed on it in the form of relations
among the models, precisely because an interaction vector field is defined as the difference of two
kinematical vector fields, viz., the difference of vector fields in two separate models. Each model on
its own, in isolation from any relation to the free kinematical vector field, cannot support the idea
of an interaction vector field. In this sense, a theory’s bare collection of models on its own does not
suffice for the recovery of the full semantics of each individual model, much more for the semantics
of the theory as a whole. So far as a proper accounting of semantics goes, a physical theory must
be more than its collection of models—it must include as well relations among the models.
The arguments of the paper notwithstanding, I feel there is something profoundly right about
a structuralist point of view—the world as we have known it does manifest in its parts clear and
beautiful structures that find elegant and verisimilar recapitulation in physical theories. The recovery
of Lagrangian mechanics from simple physical assumptions about classical systems provides as good
an example of this as one could want. The way that structuralist points of view have been expressed
up to now, however, with the naively, exuberantly optimistic idea that structure in theories always
stands in unambiguous, univocal relation with structure in the world, cannot stand. In order to
represent the structures in the world, the structures in theories must stand in some definite relation
to them. That relation, however, cannot in general be mere isomorphism; it must be something
more complex and subtle.
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